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Many animals, and an increasing number of artificial agents, display sophisticated capabilities
to perceive and manipulate objects. But human beings remain distinctive in their capacity for
flexible, creative tool use – using objects in new ways to act on the world, achieve a goal, or
solve a problem. To study this type of general physical problem solving, we introduce the
Virtual Tools game. In this game, people solve a large range of challenging physical puzzles in
just a handful of attempts. We propose that the flexibility of human physical problem solving
rests on an ability to imagine the effects of hypothesized actions, while the efficiency of human
search arises from rich action priors which are updated via observations of the world. We
instantiate these components in the “Sample, Simulate, Update” (SSUP) model and show that
it captures human performance across 30 levels of the Virtual Tools game. More broadly, this
model provides a mechanism for explaining how people condense general physical knowledge
into actionable, task-specific plans to achieve flexible and efficient physical problem-solving.
Keywords: Intuitive Physics, Physical Problem Solving, Tool Use
While trying to set up a tent on a camping trip, you realize
that the ground is too hard for the tent stakes, and you have
no hammer. What would you do? You might look around
for a suitable hammer substitute, passing over objects like
pinecones or water bottles in favor of a graspable rock. And
if that rock failed to drive in the stakes at first, you might try
a different grip, or search for a heavier rock. Most likely, you
would only need a handful of attempts before you found an
approach that works.
Determining how to pound in tent stakes without a ham-
mer is an example of the flexibility and efficiency of more
general physical problem solving. It requires a causal un-
derstanding of how the physics of the world works, and so-
phisticated abilities for inference and learning to construct
plans that solve a novel problem. Consider how, when faced
with the tent stake challenge, we do not choose an object at
random; we choose a rock because we believe we know how
we could use it to generate sufficient force on the stake. And
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if we find that the first rock fails, we again search around
for a solution, but use the knowledge of our failures to guide
our future search. This style of problem solving is a very
structured sort of trial-and-error learning: our search has el-
ements of randomness, but within a plausible solution space,
such that the goal can often be reached very quickly.
Here we study the cognitive and computational underpin-
nings of flexible tool use. While human tool use relies on a
number of cognitive systems – for instance, knowing how to
grasp and manipulate an object, or understanding how a par-
ticular tool is typically used – here we focus on “mechanical
reasoning,” or the ability to spontaneously repurpose objects
in our environment to accomplish a novel goal (Goldenberg
& Spatt, 2009; Orban & Caruana, 2014; Osiurak & Badets,
2016).
We target this mechanical reasoning because it is the type
of tool use that is quintessentially human. While other ani-
mals can manipulate objects to achieve their aims, only a few
species of birds and primates have been observed to sponta-
neously use objects in novel ways, and we often view these
activities as some of the most “human-like” forms of ani-
mal cognition (e.g., Fig. 1A,B; Shumaker, Walkup, & Beck,
2011). Similarly, while AI systems have become increas-
ingly adept at perceiving and manipulating objects, none per-
form the sort of rapid mechanical reasoning that people do.
Some artificial agents learn to use tools from expert demon-
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Figure 1. Examples of using objects to achieve a goal. (A)
Bearded capuchin monkey opening a cashew nut with an ap-
propriately sized stone (photo by Tiago Falótico; Luncz et
al., 2016). (B) New Caledonian crow using heavy blocks
to raise the water level in a tube in order to retrieve food
(Jelbert, Taylor, Cheke, Clayton, & Gray, 2014). (C) Tod-
dler using a shovel to reach a ball (from youtu.be/hwrNQ93-
568?t=198). (D) One illustrative trial in the Virtual Tools
game (https://sites.google.com/view/virtualtoolsgame). (i)
The player must get the red object into the green goal us-
ing one of the three tools. (ii) The player chooses a tool and
where to place it. (iii) Physics is turned “on” and the tool
interacts with other objects. The action results in a near miss.
strations (Xie, Ebert, Levine, & Finn, 2019), which limits
their flexibility. Others learn from thousands of years of sim-
ulated experience (Baker et al., 2019), which is significantly
longer than required for people. Still others can reason about
mechanical functions of arbitrary objects but require perfect
physical knowledge of the environment (Toussaint, Allen,
Smith, & Tenenbaum, 2018), which is unavailable in real-
world scenarios. In contrast, even young humans are capable
tool users: by the age of four they can quickly choose an ap-
propriate object and determine how to use it to solve a novel
task (e.g., picking a hooked rather than straight pipe cleaner
to retreive an object from a narrow tube, Fig. 1C; Beck, Ap-
perly, Chappell, Guthrie, & Cutting, 2011).
What are the cognitive systems that let us use tools so
flexibly, and accomplish our goals so rapidly? It has been
suggested that mechanical reasoning relies on mental simula-
tion, which lets us predict how our actions will cause changes
in the world (Osiurak & Badets, 2016). This general pur-
pose simulation is a necessary component that supports our
ability to reason about objects in novel environments, but by
itself cannot explain how we make and update our plans so
quickly. We propose that another key to rapid tool use is
knowing what sorts of actions to even consider – both from
an initial understanding of what actions are useful, and by
updating this belief from observing the outcome of our ac-
tions, in simulation and in reality.
This paper makes two contributions. First, we introduce
the Virtual Tools game, which presents a suite of physical
problem solving challenges, and allows for precise, quan-
tifiable comparisons between human and machine agents.
Second, we present a minimal model of flexible tool use,
called “Sample, Simulate, Update” (SSUP). This model is
built around an efficient albeit noisy simulation engine that
allows the model to act flexibly across a wide variety of phys-
ical tasks. To solve problems rapidly, the SSUP model con-
tains rich knowledge about the world in the form of a struc-
tured prior on candidate tools and actions likely to solve the
problem, which allows it to limit its simulations to promising
candidates. It further learns from its simulations and from
observing the outcome of its own actions to update its beliefs
about what those promising candidates should be. Across
30 Virtual Tools levels in two experiments, we show that an
instantiation of the SSUP model captures the relative diffi-
culties of different levels for human players, the particular
actions performed to attempt to solve each level, and how
the solution rates for each level evolve.
The Virtual Tools game
Inspired by human tool use, as well as mobile
physics games (Brain it On, 2015), we propose the
Virtual Tools game as a platform for investigating
the priors, representations, and planning and learn-
ing algorithms used in physical problem solving
(https://sites.google.com/view/virtualtoolsgame). This
game asks players to place one of several objects (“tools”)
into a two-dimensional dynamic physical environment in
order to achieve a goal: getting a red object into a green
region (Fig. 1D). This goal is the same for every level, but
what is required to achieve it varies greatly. Once a single
tool is placed, the physics of the world is enabled so that
players see the effect of the action they took. If the goal is
not achieved, players can “reset” the world to its original
state and try again; they are limited to a single action on
each attempt. We designed 30 levels – 20 for the original
experiment (Fig. 2) and 10 for a validation experiment
(Fig. 7A) – to test concepts such as ‘launching’, ‘blocking’,
and ‘supporting’. Of the first 20 levels, 12 were constructed
in six ‘matched pairs’ which incorporated small differences
in the goals or objects in the scene to test whether subtle
differences in stimuli would lead to observable differences
in behavior.
The Virtual Tools game presents particular challenges that
we believe underlie the kinds of reasoning required for rapid
physical problem solving more generally. First, there is a di-
versity of tasks that require different strategies and physical
concepts to solve, but employ shared physical dynamics that
approximate the real world. Second, the game requires long-
horizon causal reasoning. Since players can only interact
with the game by placing a single object, they must be able
to reason about the complex cause and effect relationships
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1. Basic 2. Bridge 3. Catapult 4. Chaining 5. Gap 6. SeeSaw 7. Unbox
8. Unsupport 11. Launch (A) 12. Launch (B) 13. Prevention (A) 14. Prevention (B)9. Falling (A) 10. Falling (B)
15. Shafts (A) 16. Shafts (B) 17. Table (A) 18. Table (B) 19. Towers (A) 20. Towers (B)
Figure 2. Twenty levels used in the Virtual Tools game. Players choose one of three tools (shown to the right of each level) to
place in the scene in order to get a red object into the green goal area. Black objects are fixed, while blue objects also move;
grey regions are prohibited for tool placement. Levels denoted with A/B labels are matched pairs.
of their action long into the future when they can no longer
intervene. Finally, the game elicits rapid trial-and-error
learning in humans. Human players do not generally solve
levels on their first attempt, but also generally do not require
more than 5-10 attempts in order to succeed. People demon-
strate a wide range of problem-solving behaviors, including
“a-ha” insights where they suddenly discover the right idea
for how to solve a particular task, as well as incremental trial-
and-error strategy refinement. Figure 3 demonstrates how
this occurs in practice, showing four different examples of
participants learning rapidly or slowly, and discovering dif-
ferent ways to use the tools across a variety of levels.
Sample, Simulate, UpdateModel (SSUP)
We consider the components required to capture both the
flexibility and efficiency of human tool use. We propose that
people achieve flexibility through an internal mental model
that allows them to imagine the effects of actions they may
have never tried before (“Simulate”). However, a mental
model alone is not sufficient – there are far too many pos-
sible actions that could be simulated, many of which are un-
informative and unlikely to achieve a specific goal. Some
mechanism for guiding an internal search is necessary to fo-
cus on useful parts of the hypothesis space. We therefore
propose people use structured, object-oriented priors (“Sam-
ple”) and a rapid belief updating mechanism (“Update”) to
guide search towards promising hypotheses. We formalize
human tool use with these components as the “Sample, Sim-
ulate, Update” model (SSUP; Fig. 4A).
SSUP is inspired by the theory of “problem solving as
search” (Newell & Simon, 1972), as well as Dyna and other
model-based policy optimization methods (Deisenroth, Neu-
mann, Peters, et al., 2013; Sutton, 1991). Crucially, we posit
that structured priors and physical simulators must already
be in place in order to solve problems as rapidly as people;
thus unlike most model-based policy optimization methods,
we do not perform online updates of the dynamics model.
We want to emphasize that we view SSUP as a general
modeling framework for physical problem solving, and only
present here one instance of that framework: the minimal
model (described below, with more detail in SI Appendix,
Section S2) that we think is needed to capture basic human
behavior in the Virtual Tools game. In the discussion we
highlight ways the model will need to be improved in future
work, as well as aspects of physical reasoning that rely on a
richer set of cognitive systems going beyond the framework
presented here.
Sample: object-based prior. At a minimum, the actions
we should consider to achieve any goal should have the po-
tential to impact our environment. We therefore incorporate
an object-based prior for sampling actions. Specifically, the
model selects one of the movable objects in the scene, then
chooses an x-coordinate in an area that extends slightly be-
yond the width of the object, and a y-coordinate either above
or below that object (Fig. 4B: Prior). For tool choice, we
assume participants are equally likely to choose any of the
three tools since all tools in the game were designed to be
unfamiliar to participants. Samples from this distribution are
used to initialize search.
Simulate: a noisy physics engine. In order to determine
which sampled actions are worth trying in the world, we as-
sume people use an “Intuitive Physics Engine” (Battaglia,
Hamrick, & Tenenbaum, 2013) to flexibly imagine the effects
of their actions. This engine is able to simulate the world
forwards in time with approximately correct but stochastic
dynamics (Sanborn, Mansinghka, & Griffiths, 2013; Smith
& Vul, 2013). Determining the effect of a proposed action
therefore involves applying that action to one’s mental rep-
resentation, and using the Intuitive Physics Engine to posit
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A - Rapid Learning
C - Discovering Effective Use of a Tool
D - Support Principle Discovery and Fine Tuning
B - Strategy Change
Figure 3. Examples of participants’ behavior on three levels, representative of rapid trial-and-error learning: Initial plans are
structured around objects, followed by exploring to identify more promising strategies and then refining actions until success.
Objects start as shown by light blue/red outlines and follow paths traced out by colored lines. Possible tool choices shown
to the right. (A) In the Catapult level, a useful strategy is often identified immediately and rapidly fine-tuned. (B) Other
participants first try an unsuccessful strategy but then switch to a more viable strategy and refine it. (C) The Launch (B) level
is designed to prevent obvious solutions. This participant may have initially believed the ball would start rolling and attempted
to use a tool as a bridge. When this failed they realized they needed to launch the ball, but only discovered after several trials
how to use a tool in a non-obvious way to accomplish this, via a hooking motion around the blocking ledge. They then took
several more trials to fine-tune this action. (D) In the SeeSaw level, a participant realized on the second attempt they must
support the platform for the ball to roll across, then tried different ways of making this happen.
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Algorithm 1 SSUP algorithm
Sample actions from prior a ∼ pi(s)
Simulate action to get noisy rewards rˆ ∼ model(s, a)
Initialize distribution pi′(s) using samples rˆ, a
while not successful do
Sample action a
Simulate action to estimate noisy reward rˆ ∼ model(s, a)
if rˆ > threshold then
Try action a in environment
Observe r
If successful, exit
Update policy with r, s, a.
else
Update policy with rˆ, s, a
end if
end while
1
Figure 4. (A) The SSUP algorithm. (B) A diagram of the model for the Virtual Tools game. It incorporates an object-based
prior, a simulation engine for filtering proposals, and an update module that suggests new proposals based on observations “in
the mind” and from actions taken in the world. (C) Illustration of the policy pi′ evolving while attempting a level. Colored
patches represent the Gaussian policy for each tool.
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the range of ways that action might cause the world to un-
fold (Craik, 1943; Dasgupta, Smith, Schulz, Tenenbaum, &
Gershman, 2018). Here we implement simulation using a
game physics engine with noisy dynamics. People charac-
teristically have noisy predictions of how collisions will re-
solve (Smith & Vul, 2013), and so for simplicity we assume
uncertainty about outcomes is driven only by noise in those
collisions (the direction and amount of force that is applied
between two colliding objects).1
Since the internal model is imperfect, to evaluate an ac-
tion we produce a small number of stochastic simulations
(nsims, set here at 4) to form a set of hypotheses about the
outcome. To formalize how good an outcome is (the reward
of a given action), we borrow an idea from the causal rea-
soning literature for how people conceptualize “almost” suc-
ceeding (Gerstenberg, Goodman, Lagnado, & Tenenbaum,
2015). “Almost” succeeding is not a function of the absolute
distance an action moved you towards your goal, but instead
how much of a difference that action made. To capture this,
the minimum distance between the green goal area and any
of the red goal objects is recorded; these values are aver-
aged across the simulations and normalized by the minimum
distance that would have been achieved if no tool had been
added. The reward used in SSUP is 1 minus the normalized
distance, so that closer objects lead to higher reward.
Once the model finds a good enough action (formalized
as the average reward being above some threshold), it takes
that action “in the world.” Additionally, to model time limits
for thinking, if the model considers more than T different ac-
tion proposals without acting (set here at 5), it takes the best
action it has imagined so far. We evaluate the effect of all
parameter choices in a sensitivity analysis (see SI Appendix,
Fig. S1).
Update: learning from thoughts and actions. So far we
have described a way of intelligently initializing search to
avoid considering actions that will not be useful. But what if
the prior still presents an intractably large space of possible
actions?
To tackle this, we incorporate an update mechanism that
learns from both simulated and real experience to guide fu-
ture search towards more promising regions of the hypothesis
space (Juechems & Summerfield, 2019). This is formally de-
fined as a Gaussian mixture model policy over the three tools
and their positions, pi′(s), which represents the model’s belief
about high value actions for each tool. pi′(s) is initialized with
samples from the object-oriented prior, and updated using a
simple policy gradient algorithm (Williams, 1992). This al-
gorithm will shape the posterior beliefs around areas to place
each tool which are expected to move target objects close to
the goal, and are therefore likely to contain a solution. Such
an update strategy is useful when it finds high value actions
that are nearby successful actions, but may also get stuck in
local optima where a successful action does not exist. We
therefore use a standard technique from reinforcement learn-
ing: epsilon-greedy exploration. With epsilon-greedy explo-
ration, potential actions are sampled from the policy 1 - %
of the time, and from the prior % of the time. Note that this
exploration is only used for proposing internal simulations;
model actions are chosen based on the set of prior simulation
outcomes. This is akin to thinking of something new, instead
of focusing on an existing strategy.
Results
We analyze human performance on the first 20 levels of
the Virtual Tools game and compare humans to the SSUP
model and alternates, including SSUP models with ablations
and two alternate learning baselines. We show that the full
SSUP model best captures human performance. Access to
the game and all data including human and model place-
ments is provided at https://sites.google.com/view/
virtualtoolsgame.
Human results
Experiments were approved by the MIT Committee on
the Use of Humans as Experimental Subjects under proto-
col #0812003014. Participants were notified of their rights
before the experiment, were free to terminate participation at
any time by closing the browser window, and were compen-
sated monetarily for their time.
We recruited 94 participants through Amazon Mechanical
Turk and asked each participant to solve 14 levels: all 8 of the
unmatched levels, and one variation of each of the 6 matched
pairs (randomly selected).
Participants could choose to move on once a problem was
solved, or after two minutes had passed. See SI Appendix,
Section S1 for further details.
The variation in difficulty between levels of the game was
substantial. Participants showed an average solution rate of
81% (sd = 19%), with the range covering 31% for the hard-
est level to 100% for the easiest. Similarly, participants took
an average of 4.5 actions (sd = 2.5) for each level, with a
range from 1.5 to 9.4 average attempts. Even within trials,
there was a large amount of heterogeneity in the number of
actions participants used to solve the level. This would be
expected with “rapid trial-and-error” learning: participants
who initially tried a promising action would solve the puzzle
quickly, while others explored different actions before hap-
pening on promising ones (e.g., Fig. 3).
Behavior differed across all six matched level pairs. We
study whether these subtle differences do indeed affect be-
havior, even without feedback on the first action, by asking
whether we can identify which level variant each action came
1We also considered models with additional sources of physics
model uncertainty added, but found that the additional parameters
did not improve model fit, so we do not analyze those models here.
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1. Basic
6. SeeSaw
11. Launch (A)
16. Shafts (B)
2.Bridge
7. Unbox
12. Launch (B)
17. Table (A)
3. Catapult
8. Unsupport
13. Prevention (A)
18. Table (B)
4. Chaining
9. Falling (A)
14. Prevention (B)
19. Towers (A)
5. Gap
10. Falling (B)
15. Shafts (A)
20. Towers (B)
A B C
Figure 5. (A) Comparison of average number of human participants’ attempts for each level with average number of attempts
for the SSUP model. Bars indicate 95% confidence intervals on estimates of the means. (B)Comparison of human participants’
accuracy on each trial versus the accuracy of the SSUP model. (C) Comparison of human participants’ accuracy to all alternate
models. Numbers correspond to the trials in Fig. 2.
from. We find these actions are differentiable across matched
levels in ‘Shafts’, ‘Prevention’, ‘Launch’ and ‘Table’ on the
first attempt, but not ‘Falling’ or ‘Towers’ (see SI Appendix,
Fig. S11 and Sec. S6A for details). However, participants re-
quired a different number of actions to solve every level (all
ts > 2.7, ps < 0.01). This suggests that people are paying
attention to subtle differences in the scene or goal to choose
their actions.
Model results
We investigate several metrics for comparing the models
to human data. First, we look at how quickly and how of-
ten each model solves each level, and whether that matches
participants. This is measured as the correlation and root
mean squared error (RMSE) between the average number of
participant attempts for each level and the average number of
model attempts for each level, and the correlation and RMSE
between human and model solution rates. The SSUP model
explains the patterns of human behavior across the different
levels well (SI Appendix, Table S2). It uses a similar number
of attempts on each level (r = 0.71; 95% CI = [0.62, 0.76];
mean empirical attempts across all levels: 4.48, mean model
attempts: 4.24; Fig. 5A) and achieves similar accuracy (r =
0.86; 95% CI = [0.76, 0.89]; Fig. 5B).
Across many levels, the SSUP model not only achieves
the same overall solution rate as people, but approaches it
at the same rate. We measure this by looking at cumulative
solution rates – over all participants or model runs, what pro-
portion solved each level within X placements – and find that
people and the model often demonstrate similar solution pro-
files (Fig. 6A; see SI Appendix, Section S6B for quantitative
comparison).
We can look in more detail how the model accomplishes
this by comparing both the first actions that people and the
model takes (Fig. 6B), and the actions that both take to solve
a level (Fig. 6C). Like our human participants, the model
takes significantly different actions on the first attempt be-
tween matched level pairs (see SI Appendix, Sec. S6A).
More generally, both people and the model will often begin
with a variety of plausible actions (e.g., Catapult). In some
cases, both will attempt initial actions that have very little
impact on the scene (e.g., SeeSaw and Prevention (B)); this
could be because people cannot think of any useful actions
and so decide to try something, similar to how the model
can exceed its simulation threshold. However, in other cases,
the model’s initial predictions diverge from people, and this
leads to a different pattern of search and solutions. For in-
stance, in Falling (A), the model quickly finds that placing an
object under the container will reliably tip the ball onto the
ground, but people are biased to drop an object from above.
Because of this, the model often rapidly solves the level with
an object below, whereas a proportion of participants find a
way to flip the container from above; this discrepancy can
also be seen in the comparison of number of attempts before
the solution, where the model finds a solution quickly, while
people take a good deal longer (Fig. 5A). For comparisons
of the first and last actions across all levels, see SI Appendix,
Fig. S11.
Model comparisons on Virtual Tools. We compare the
full SSUP model against a set of six alternate models. Three
models investigate the contribution of each SSUP component
by removing the prior, simulation, or updating individually.
Two models propose alternate solution methods: learning
better world models rather than learning over actions (Pa-
rameter Tuning) or replacing the prior and simulator with a
learned proposal mechanism (DQN + Updating). The Pa-
rameter Tuning alternate model uses inference to learn ob-
ject densities, frictions and elasticities from observed trajec-
tories. The learned proposal mechanism corresponds to a
model-free deep reinforcement learning agent (Mnih et al.,
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Figure 6. (A) Cumulative solution rate over number of placements for participants vs. the SSUP model. (B) Distribution of
model actions (background) versus human actions (points) on the first and last attempts of the level for a selection of four
levels. The distribution of model actions is estimated based on fitting a Kernel Density Estimate to the actions taken by the
model across 250 simulations. Colors indicate the tool used, with the tools and associated colors shown to the right of each
level. In most levels, the SSUP model captures the evolution of participants’ solutions well, including the particular actions
chosen; in the few cases that it differs, there is no alternative model that systematically explains these differences.
2015) which is trained on a set of 4500 randomly generated
levels of the game (see SI Appendix, Sec. S5), and then up-
dated online for each of the 20 testing levels using the same
mechanism as SSUP. This model has substantially more ex-
perience with the environment than other models, and serves
as a test of whether model-free methods can make use of
this experience to learn generalizable policies that can guide
rapid learning. Finally, we compare to a “Guessing” base-
line for performance if an agent were to simply place tools
randomly. See Fig. 5C and SI Appendix, Table S2 for these
comparisons.
Eliminating any of the three SSUP components causes a
significant decrease in performance (measured as deviation
between empirical and model cumulative solution curves; all
bootstrapped ps < 0.0001; see SI Appendix, Sec. S6B,
Fig. S6 for further detail). The reduced models typically
require more attempts to solve levels because they are either
searching in the wrong area of the action space (No Prior), at-
tempting actions that have no chance of being successful (No
Simulation), or do not guide search towards more promising
areas (No Updating).
DQN + Updating performs worst of all plausible alter-
nate models, using the most actions and solving levels at a
rate barely over chance. Because this is equivalent to the
No Simulation model with a different prior, its poor perfor-
mance suggests that generalized action policies cannot eas-
ily be learned from repeatedly playing similar levels (see SI
Appendix, Sec. S5).
Because the Parameter Tuning model is equivalent to the
No Updating model except that the properties of the dynam-
ics model can be learned in Parameter Tuning, comparing
those two models allows us to test whether we need to as-
sume that people are learning the dynamics of the world in
this game. The fact that both models perform roughly equiv-
alently (see Fig. 5C) suggests that we do not need this as-
sumption here.
Finally, we quantified how well each model captured the
particular actions people took. Due to heterogeneity in par-
ticipants’ responses, we were unable to cleanly differentiate
models’ performance except to find that the DQN + Updat-
ing model underperformed the rest (see SI Appendix, Sec.
S6C). However, no model reached the theoretical noise ceil-
ing, suggesting components of the SSUP framework could
be improved to better explain participants’ actions (see the
Discussion).
Validation on novel levels
We conducted a second experiment to test whether the
models generalize to novel levels and physical concepts with-
out tuning hyperparameters. For this experiment, we created
10 new levels: 6 novel level types and 4 variants of the orig-
inals (Fig 7A), testing an independent sample of 50 partici-
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A
B
C
D
A1. Balance
A6. Trap
A2. Collapse
A7. Basic (v2)
A3. Remove
A8. Falling (v2)
A4. Shove
A9. Launch (v2)
A5. Spiky
A10. Table (v2)
Figure 7. Results on 10 additional trials. (A) Trials used for the second experiment. (B) The cumulative solution rate for
participants and the SSUP model. (C) Comparison of the number of human and model actions by trial. (D) Comparison of
human and model accuracy on each trial.
pants on all levels. The 6 novel level types were designed to
test new physical strategies, including balancing, breaking,
and removing objects from a ball’s path. All other experi-
mental details were identical to the main experiment.
Without tuning any model parameters, we find a good
correspondence between human and model solution rates
(Fig. 7B), and a strong correlation between the model’s per-
formance and human performance across number of place-
ments (Fig. 7C, r = 0.85) and accuracy (Fig. 7D, r = 0.95).
Similar to the main experiment, we find a decrement in per-
formance if the prior or simulation are removed, or for the
DQN + Updating model (all bootstrapped ps < 0.0001; SI
Appendix, Fig. S7). However, while numerically worse,
we do not find a reliable difference if the update mecha-
nism is removed (p = 0.055) or swapped for model learning
(p = 0.346), suggesting that the particular reward function
or update procedure might be less applicable to these levels
(see SI Appendix, Sec. S6B).
Discussion
We introduce the Virtual Tools game for investigating
flexible physical problem solving in humans and machines,
and show that human behavior on this challenge expresses
a wide variety of trial-and-error problem solving strategies.
We also introduce a model for human physical problem solv-
ing: “Sample, Simulate, Update.” The model presumes that
to solve these physics problems, people rely on an inter-
nal model of how the world works. Learning in this game
therefore involves condensing this vast world knowledge to
rapidly learn how to act in each instance, using a structured
trial-and-error search.
Model limitations
Although the SSUP model we used solves many of the
levels of the Virtual Tools game in a human-like way, we
believe that this is still only a first approximation to the rich
set of cognitive processes that people bring to the task. In
particular, there are at least two ways in which the model is
insufficient: its reliance on very simple priors, and its plan-
ning and generalizing only in the forwards direction.
We can see the limits of the object-based prior in the
Falling (A) level (Fig. 5B): people are much less likely to
consider placing an object underneath the container to tip
it over. Instead, many people try to tip it over from above,
even though this is more difficult. In this way, people’s pri-
ors over strategies are context specific, which causes them
to be slower than the model in this level. In other cases, this
context specificity is helpful: for instance, in the hypothetical
level shown in Fig. 8A, there is a hole that one of the tools fits
suspiciously perfectly into. Many people notice this coinci-
dence quickly, but because the model cannot assess how tools
might fit into the environment without running a simulation,
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it only succeeds 10% of the time. In future work, a more
complex prior could be instantiated in the SSUP framework,
but it remains an open question how people might form these
context-specific priors, or how they might be shaped over
time via experience.
People show greater flexibility than our model in the abil-
ity to work backwards from the goal state to find more eas-
ily solvable sub-goals (Anderson, 1993). In the hypotheti-
cal level in Fig. 8B, the catapult is finicky, which means that
most catapulting actions will not make it over the barrier, and
therefore will never hit the ball on the left. Instead, the easi-
est way to increase the objective function is by the incorrect
strategy of knocking the ball on the right to get close to the
goal, and therefore the model only solves the level 8% of the
time. Working backwards to set the first sub-goal of launch-
ing the ball over the barrier would prevent getting stuck with
knocking the ball as a local minimum. From an engineering
standpoint, creating sub-goals is natural with discrete prob-
lem spaces (Newell & Simon, 1972), but it is less clear how
these might be discovered in the continuous action space of
the Virtual Tools game.
Related cognitive systems
There is an extensive body of research into the cognitive
systems that underlie the use of real-world tools, including
understanding how to manipulate them and knowing their
typical uses (e.g. Beck et al., 2011; Orban & Caruana, 2014;
Osiurak & Badets, 2016; Vaesen, 2012). Here our focus was
on “mechanical knowledge” of tools: how to use objects
in novel situations. However, in real-world tool use, these
systems work together with motor planning and semantic
knowledge of tools. Future work can focus on these links,
such as how novel tools become familiar, or how our motor
limits constrain the plans we might consider.
The Virtual Tools game presents a problem solving task
that blends facets of prior work, but encompasses a novel
challenge. To rapidly solve these problems requires good
prior knowledge of the dynamics – unlike Complex Problem
Solving in which the dynamics are learned in an evolving sit-
uation (Frensch & Funke, 1995) – and further iteration once a
promising solution is considered – unlike the ‘a-ha’ moment
that leads immediately to a solution in Insight Problem Solv-
ing (Chu & MacGregor, 2011; Gick & Holyoak, 1980). Un-
like in traditional model-based or model-free reinforcement
learning, in this task people bring rich models of the world
that they can quickly tailor to specific, novel problems.
Distilling rich world knowledge to useful task knowledge
is necessary for any agent interacting with a complex world.
One proposal for how this occurs is “learning by thinking”
(Lombrozo, 2018): translating knowledge from one source
(internal models of physics) to another, more specific instan-
tiation (a mapping between actions and outcomes on this par-
ticular level). We show how SSUP instantiates one example
A B
Figure 8. Two problems that demonstrate limitations of the
current model. (A) A “suspicious conicidence” that one tool
fits perfectly in the hole. (B) Creating a ‘sub-goal’ to launch
the ball onto the other side is useful.
of “learning by thinking”: by training a policy with data from
an internal model. Evidence for this sort of knowledge trans-
fer has been found in people (Gershman, Markman, & Otto,
2014; Gershman, Zhou, & Kommers, 2017), but has focused
on simpler discrete settings in which the model and policy
are jointly learned.
Virtual Tools as an AI Challenge
In preliminary experiments with model-free reinforce-
ment learning approaches (Mnih et al., 2015), we found lim-
ited generalization with inefficient learning across almost all
of the Virtual Tools levels (see SI Appendix, Section S5) de-
spite significant experience with related levels.
Based on our human experiments, we believe that model-
based approaches will be required to be able to play games
like Virtual Tools. Such approaches are becoming increas-
ingly popular in machine learning (Weber et al., 2017), es-
pecially when combined with “learning-to-learn” techniques
that can learn to adapt quickly to new tasks (Finn, Abbeel,
& Levine, 2017; Schmidhuber, Zhao, & Schraudolph, 1998).
Learning these models remains challenging, but approaches
that incorporate added structure have excelled in recent
years (Chang, Ullman, Torralba, & Tenenbaum, 2016; Ja-
yaraman, Ebert, Efros, & Levine, 2018). Within the AI
and robotics communities, model-based methods are already
popular (Garcia, Prett, & Morari, 1989; Kaelbling & Lozano-
Pérez, 2010; Toussaint et al., 2018). Remaining challenges
include how to learn accurate enough models that can be used
with raw sensor data (Kroemer, Niekum, & Konidaris, 2019),
and how to handle dynamic environments.
Virtual Tools adds to a growing set of environments that
test artificial agents’ abilities to predict and reason using
physics, such as the concurrently developed PHYRE bench-
mark (Bakhtin, van der Maaten, Johnson, Gustafson, & Gir-
shick, 2019) and others (Bapst et al., 2019; Ge, Lee, Renz, &
Zhang, 2016; Wenke, Saunders, Qiu, & Fleming, 2019). In
contrast, our focus is on providing problems that people find
challenging but intuitive, where solutions are non-obvious
and do not rely on precise knowledge of world dynamics. By
contributing human data to compare artificial and biological
intelligence, we hope to provide a test-bed for more human-
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like artificial agents.
Future empirical directions
This work provides an initial foray into formalizing the
computational and empirical underpinnings of flexible tool
use, but there remains much to study. For instance, we do
not find evidence that people learn more about the world,
perhaps because here there is little benefit to additional preci-
sion here. But there are cases where learning the dynamics is
clearly helpful (e.g., discovering that an object is abnormally
heavy, or glued down), and we would expect people to update
their physical beliefs in these cases. When and in what ways
people update their internal models to support planning is an
important area of study.
Children can discover how to use existing objects earlier
than they can make novel tools (Beck et al., 2011), suggest-
ing that tool creation is more challenging than tool use. Yet
it is the ability to make and then pass on novel tools that
is theorized to drive human culture (Tomasello, 1999). It is
therefore important to understand not just how people use
tools, but also how they develop and transmit them, which
we can study by expanding the action space of the Virtual
Tools game.
Conclusion
Understanding how to flexibly use tools to accomplish our
goals is a basic and central cognitive capability. In the Vir-
tual Tools game, we find that people efficiently use tools to
solve a wide variety of physical problems. We can explain
this rapid trial-and-error learning with the three components
of the SSUP framework: rich prior world knowledge, simula-
tion of hypothetical actions, and the ability to learn from both
simulations and observed actions. We hope this empirical do-
main and modeling framework can provide the foundations
for future research on this quintessentially human trait: us-
ing, making, and reasoning about tools, and more generally
shaping the physical world to our ends.
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